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Reconciling Environmental Policy with Employment,
International Competitiveness and Participation
Requirements.
T. Ziesemer
MERIT and Department of Economics, Rijksuniversiteit Limburg, Maastricht
October 1995
Abstract. We argue that a conventional double dividend policy - defined as reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions and unemployment through taxation of energy and CO2 emissions
and subsidization of wage costs - and the aim of keeping international competitiveness intact
are mutually exclusive concepts. It is suggested that a double dividend policy that aims at
reducing GHG emissions and unemployment without violation of international
competitiveness has to tax energy use and CO2 emissions of households and should use the
revenues to subsidize investment in energy-saving technologies to reduce marginal costs of
firms. Reduction of energy coefficients lowers marginal costs and prices and therefore
increases competitiveness and employment in an environmentally friendly way and may
induce other parts of the world to participate in GHG emission reduction policies. According
to this proposal the principle of causation has to be dropped nationally but not internationally.
* This paper is a slightly revised version of Chapter 4 of "Energy Technologies,
Environmental Policy and Competitiveness", Final Report for JOULE II programme of the
European Commission DG XII (F.1) by Paul Diederen, René Kemp, Perry Verberne, Thomas
Ziesemer and Adriaan van Zon, MERIT, University of Limburg, May 1995. I would like to
thank Paul Diederen, Marcel Janssen, René Kemp, Michael Kohlhaas, Hans van Meijl,
Barbara Praetorius, Luc Soete, Perry Verberne and Adriaan van Zon as well as the seminar
participants at the DIW Berlin and the session participants at the ’Jahrestagung des Vereins
für Socialpolitik’ in Linz/Austria, Sept. 1995, especially the discussant Peter Michaelis, for
helpful discussions. Responsibility for views and opinions expressed is entirely mine and do
not necessarily reflect those of the DG XII or the persons mentioned above. I am also grateful
to Silvana de Sanctis for the very careful text and formula processing.
1
Reconciling Environmental Policy with Employment,
International Competitiveness and Participation
Requirements.
1. Introduction
The EC proposal for GHG-emission reduction suggests (among other things) the level of
taxation of 10$ per barrel of oil equivalent with exemptions for energy-intensive industries.
Moreover, international competitiveness of firms and unemployment should not be reduced.
How taxes should be rebated, however, is an issue left open up till now. Reduction of existing
distortionary taxes and subsidies for wage costs have been proposed. Here we argue that
subsidies for investment into energy-saving technologies may be a superior way of revenue
rebatement that supports the environmental, employment and competitiveness goals. It takes
international competitiveness requirements into account right from the beginning instead of
making concepts which require exemptions.
In conventional AGE (Applied General Equilibrium) analysis there is costless
exogenous energy-saving technical progress and costless substitution between capital and
labour in response to price changes (see Conrad and Wang 1993 for an elegant introduction).
Here we undertake some first steps to replace these elements. We introduce fixed costs and
induced energy savings into an economic model with environmental policy. Both are costly.
We use a modification of the monopolistic competition model developed by Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977). The reason is that we prefer a framework suitable for differentiated products over one
for homogeneous products; the evidence (see Morrison 1989, 1990, 1992) is not in contrast
with the Chamberlinian model of monopolistic competition: At the macro-level and that of
highly aggregated sectors profits turn out to be approximately zero. In monopolistic
competition models fixed costs limit the number of firms and there is monopolistic price
setting. Environmental taxes lead to price changes induced by changes of marginal costs. We
allow for many consumption goods and use of capital goods in production. Each variant is
assumed to be produced by only one firm which therefore is also the only exporter in the
world. The model is extended with an energy-environment part to analyze the international
competitiveness of energy producers and users when environmental policy encourages
energy-saving technologies and reduces distortionary taxes on wage income or subsidizes
wages. As this chapter is concerned with ’what happens in the next ten years after the
introduction of an environmental tax’, we don’t treat technology as an endogenous R&D
variable because the lag from invention to marketing is typically more than ten years in many
cases. This means that energy savings for the next ten years will have to be achieved with
technologies that are available now. Investment in energy-saving technologies, may be of the
retrofitting type, constitutes the only form of endogenous technical progress in the model.
However, it is easy to imagine that an increase in demand for these technologies increases
the incentive for R&D in this field.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. In section 2 we set up a model which will guide
the analysis. In section 3 we show that the impact effects of energy and C02 taxes under the
EC proposal and subsidies for investment in energy-saving technologies will be rather limited
in spite of the sensitivity of the results with respect to the price elasticities of demand and the
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level of the tax. In section 4 we treat the dynamic decision of the firm with emphasis on
endogenous technical change reducing energy coefficients through investment in
energy-saving technologies which lowers energy coefficients. In section 5 we argue that a
policy that leaves international competitiveness unaffected has to make sure that marginal
costs are not increased by taxes. A double dividend or double benefit defined as
environmental benefit cum unemployment reduction can be obtained only if the revenues from
energy and C02 taxes are rebated as subsidies for investment in energy-saving technologies.
In section 6 we show that prices are higher than marginal costs. Therefore a policy that
speeds up the decrease in marginal costs by lowering the energy coefficients through
investment in energy-saving technologies will lead to prices that may decrease more strongly
than marginal costs do. This mitigates the negative income effects for households. In contrast,
energy and CO2 taxes on the firm level may increase prices to a greater extent than marginal
costs and reduce international competitiveness. In section 7 investment dynamics are
considered. It is shown that energy and CO2 taxes have a negative impact on investment in
the capital stock and on employment whereas subsidies on investment in energy-saving
technologies have a positive impact on employment, the environment and international
competitiveness. Section 8 briefly summarizes the argument in a self-contained manner. The
reader who is not particularly interested in technical details can jump to it immediately.
2. Specification of the model
The model set up in this section serves several purposes. Firstly, it disciplines the line of
thought of this chapter. Secondly, it is the basis for some quantifications in later sections.
Thirdly, it makes the incentive effects from taxes and subsidies on investment in
energy-saving technologies and the capital stock explicit.
Assumptions on preferences of households are described by the following utility function
(1)u
n
i 1
c
i
i
im
c
im
im f
l
ln El i 1,..., n
im n 1,...,n n
Consumption consists of all sectors’ deliveries, , as in input-output tables. Some consumerci
goods, may be imported indirectly. The utility function is of the CES type with respectcim
to the consumer goods with elasticity and of the ln-type with respect to the
im im
environment E and f is a parameter. The environmental part of (1) - where l is a country
index and the summation over countries reflects global pollution - has marginal utility such
that it moves quicker towards infinity if E goes to zero than marginal utility of andci cim
moves to infinity if and go towards zero. In Soete and Ziesemer (1992) this was aci cim
necessary assumption to make sure that the environmental tax is positive in the equilibrium
and in the optimum. The positivity problem arises from the inefficiency of monopolistic prices
under monopolistic competition. Monopolistic production is lower than optimum production
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and therefore c.p. should be increased. However, pollution is an argument in favour of
reducing output. In the present context it is widely agreed that the environmental tax,
whatever its form, should be positive. To make sure that this is a result in general equilibrium
and central optimum considerations it was necessary to make the environmental part steeper
in marginal utility. In short, utility function (1) reflects the implicit preferences of politicians
who favour environmental policy over anti-monopoly policy and material wealth. This
assumption will have no impact on the issues treated in the chapter as long as optimal policy
is not discussed. Export demand can either be assumed to be derived from a foreign utility
function corresponding to (1) with domestic and imported goods,
(2)E
i
x
iEx
iEx
i
x
iEx
iEx i 1,..., n
or, alternatively, from a demand function with constant price elasticities.
Production of domestically produced intermediates, has labour and capital requirementsxj
(3)Lj bLj aLj xj j 1,..., n
(4)Kj bKj aKj xj j 1,... n
where b-terms represent fixed costs and a-terms variable costs. a-terms could be endogenized
to allow for substitution, which means that they are a function of factor prices. Because of
the fixed costs it is advantageous for each firm that enters the market to produce a new
variant and not to enter any other firms market. Therefore each good is produced only in one
country. This is the perfect specialization result known from international trade models with
differentiated goods. is an abbreviation for assembled investment intermediates:Kj
(5)Kj ⌡⌠
t
∞
[
i
(ed(τ t)Iij(τ)βij]dτ with i 1,..., e, r,..., n
is the elasticity of the capital stock of sector j with respect to investment goods producedβij
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in sector i. Later vintages of investment have higher productivity at rate d. Differentiating Kj
with respect to time delivers
(6)˙Kj
i
Iij (t)βij d⌡⌠
t
∞ i
[ed(τ t)Iij(τ)βij ]dτ
To have the stock of capital, at the desired level investment deliveries, are assembledKj Iij
for each j which is expressed at the first term of the right hand side of (6). At the same time,
productivity of all vintages is getting more and more backward compared to that of most
recent investment.
Intermediates are used for the production of intermediates :xij xj
(7)xij aij xj i,j 1,..., r
Technologies of the Energy-Environment complex
The intermediate variables i = 1, ..., n are subdivided as follows:
non-energy intermediates i = 1, ..., e
energy delivering i = e+1, ..., r and
energy-saving intermediates i = r+1, ..., n
Through investment in energy-saving technologies, i = r+1, ..., n, the firms j may reduce
energy demand:
(8)a˙ij
n
i r 1
x
βij
ij i e 1, ..., r; j 1,..., n
The interpretation of equation (8) is that the coefficients of energy delivering sectors i = e+1,
..., r to all sectors j = 1, ..., n are reduced by using energy-saving inputs from sectors i = r+1,
..., n. Households don’t change technologies with respect to energy consumption. But they
may reduce energy consumption by investing in retrofitting measures. If energy becomes more
expansive they invest in thermal insulation measures, which is considered to be a pure
substitution of energy.
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The environmental stock can be thought of as having some natural level E¯
if there is no pollution. Pollution which diminishes environmental qualities is proportional to
energy production of different sorts i = e+1, ..., r. Each energy from i = e+1, ..., r has its
own way to ’contribute’ to the environmental problem. This is expressed by the pollution
coefficient , ... , , which are multiplied by the quantity of energy use of theCO2
e 1 CO2r
forms i = e+1, ..., r to express the contribution to pollution (dropping the country index
henceforth):
(9)
E E
v [(c xEx )e 1
n
j 1
x
e 1 ,j ,
(c xEx )e 2
j
x
e 2 ,j ,
...,
(c xEx )r
j
x
r,j] (CO2e 1,..., CO2r)
is energy production delivered to domestic and foreign consumers. The pollution(c Ex)
e 1
coefficient are given at constant values because there are no filters or substitutesCO2i
available. The difference between the natural level E¯ and the vector product results in the
environmental stock E in (9), where v is a parameter.
Externality, policy instruments and budgets
In the sequel we discuss some desirable properties of the taxes in question:
i) a carbon tax combined with
ii) an inflation-protected ad valorem energy tax for non-greenhouse externalities of, e.g.,
nuclear energy with its uninsured risks; both of them are to be rebated through
iii) subsidies (negative taxes) for energy-saving investments and externality-free energy
forms like wind and solar energy and perhaps wage subsidies.
The justification is as follows.
ad i) It is clear from the principals of tariffs and taxation that an instrument is most efficient
if it goes to the roots of the problem (see Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983 on policy ranking).
To tackle carbon one should therefore have a carbon tax. This is also a quantified result in
Jorgenson and Wilcoxon, 1993. If administrative costs are high, however, this result may have
to be modified to a different kind of a tax.
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ad ii) The advantage of ad valorem taxes is that they are less sensitive to inflation. The EC
proposal of a tax at a level of 10 U.S.$ per barrel of oil equivalent, ECU .7 per Giga-Joule
and ECU 35 per ton of carbon (see Koopman, Mors, Scherp, 1993) is a nominal, specific tax.
After ten years of inflation at 2% from 1990 to 2000 the real value of the ten dollars is only
about 8.3 dollars at 1990 prices. In contrast, an ad valorem tax is a price markup which
adjusts automatically with price inflation. In case of clear deflation agreements it is of course
possible to construct equivalences between the two when market prices exist. If deflation
agreements are lacking, however, with ad valorem taxes it is beyond any doubt that one is
talking about real effects. Of course, this only applies to the energy tax here because there
are no prices for carbon and therefore there is no ad valorem tax for carbon. Undesired effects
on nuclear energy could be tackled by an energy tax as a substitute for the optimal insurance
contribution for nuclear accidents. However, there seems to be a principal decision that the
energy tax is .7 per Giga-Joule which is a specific tax. It is as sensitive to inflation as the
specific carbon tax, which cannot be an ad valorem tax. Both are eroded in case of inflation.
ad iii) The carbon tax can be at the lowest of all levels associated with alternative rebatement
schemes and compatible with international CO2-emission reduction agreements if its revenues
are used for subsidizing energy-saving investments and use of energy forms that have no CO2
externalities. These forms of rebatement are superior to those of reducing VATs, income
taxes, or labour costs because they can be reconciled with environmental, employment and
international competitiveness goals.
Exemptions to this rule could only be based on extreme, non-optimal distortions in
these other taxes. In the latter case there are no net costs of CO2 mitigation because one
actually can cover them by distortion reductions! There is some support for such a ’non
problem’ view (see Koopman, Mors, Scherp 1993, Table 2, where Spain and UK have net
gains of .1 and .5 percent of GDP respectively from a VAT-rebatement scenario and Germany
and Portugal have no impact on their GDP from a CO2/energy tax). However, if a countries’
tax system is more distortionary than those of other countries, it could reform its tax system
by making it more similar to those of other countries quite independent of any environmental
policies. One way to do this is to optimize the expenditure side of the economy as Barro
(1990) and Sørensen (1993) do it in order to arrive at first-best results instead of reducing
excess burdens for arbitrarily given levels of public expenditure as it is done in the so called
optimal taxation literature (see Lucas 1990 and Schöb 1995). Additional gains from reducing
remaining tax-distortions can perhaps be obtained from an ecological tax reform if optimizing
the expenditure side is impossible at the current state of knowledge or the political willingness
to reconsider public expenditures is absent. But it is quite unclear how far a tax reform can
go without ecological reform elements and how much necessarily has to be attributed to the
ecological elements.
We will now examine the proposed energy-saving-rebatement scenario in more detail.
If the rebatement is going to labour costs, given the environmental effects for reaching
internationally fixed goals, the taxes have to be much higher if the advantages from
subsidizing energy saving and non-externality energies are not used. If 35 ECU per ton carbon
is needed for reaching the goal of international agreements, the carbon tax could be lower
than 35 ECU if the revenues are used for energy-saving investments. Thus, there is a double
dividend but only at a higher price per ton carbon than under an carbon reducing rebatement
scheme. The dividend may go partly to the unemployment.
The modelling work takes into account the above considerations. However, the energy
tax will be modelled as a specific tax in accordance with the EC proposal.
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This means that the firm must pay a tax t to the government for each unit (ton of
carbon) of environmental rights to pollute CO2. Tax payments are described in the following
equation:
(10)
t(E E)
t v (c xEx )e 1
n
j 1
x
e 1, j ,(c xEx )e 2
j
X
e 2 , j,...,(c xEx )r
j
x
r,j)
(CO2
e 1 ,...,CO2r)
If the coefficients are defined as tons of carbon per unit of energy quantity of theCO2i
element in the vector to which it is multiplied, then t is the ECU price for the pollution of
a ton of carbon, which is 35 ECU in the EC proposal. Taxing use of energy is an alternative
that will be written as an element of the budgets with as the tax rate per GJ of energy typeτi
i.
Agents budgets
Producer k - where k = 1, ...,n is a certain value of i and j - has the following profits from
revenues minus costs:
(11)
pik
n
1
pkxkj pkck pkI
s
k pk xkEx
n
r 1
si pi xik
n
1
pi xik
im
pim xim,k
t
r
e 1
xik CO2i
r
e 1
τi xik R⌡⌠
t
∞ i
pi(τ) Iik(τ)d dτ [wk(1 sw1) sw2]Lk
The first term are deliveries to other producers, the second to households, the third for
investments where an upper index s indicates ’supply’, the fourth for exports; the -term issi
an investment subsidy for buying energy-saving technologies which may vary across sectors
i (when different goods have different energy-saving properties); term six are costs for
domestically produced intermediates, which are assumed not to be used as energy saving
technologies and term seven for foreign produced intermediates; the t-term is the tax for a ton
of carbon emission; the -term is a positive energy tax which can vary by energy type andτi
it is a negative tax (subsidy) for energy use of non-externality types like wind and sun.
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Energy is measured in gigajoule, GJ. Investment is financed through loans on which a
nominal interest rate R has to be paid. is an ad valorem subsidy to wages and is as
w1 sw2
specific subsidy to wages.
All non-energy, energy and energy-saving-technology producers have such a profit function.
Households
(12)
w
j
Lj RW
j
pij
n
1
pi ci
n n
n 1
p˜im c˜im t
r
e 1
ci CO2i
r
e 1
τici
n
r 1
si pi ci ˙W 0
The first term is wage income. The second term is capital income as far as it yields a
competitive capital market interest rate paid by domestic firms. The third term are
monopolistic profits which may be zero if market access competes them away as in the
empirical analysis of Morrison (1989, 1990, 1992). The fourth and fifth terms are
consumption of domestic and imported goods. The sixth term is the carbon tax payments
imposed on households. The seventh term is the energy tax which should be negative for solar
energy. The eight terms are subsidies for energy-saving purchases. Households differ from
firms in that they do not explicitly change energy coefficients but instead are assumed to buy
energy-saving technologies instead of energy.
The government budget is assumed to be balanced
(13)
t
k
r
e 1
xik CO2i
k
r
e 1
τixik t
r
e 1
ci CO2i
r
e 1
τi ci
k
n
r 1
si pi xik
n
r 1
si pi ci
k
[s
w1 w sw2 ]Lk 0
Energy is assumed to be imported indirectly. Therefore we don’t model import taxes on
energy explicitly.
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Current account
+ decrease in foreign reserves =˙D
(14)Pim cIM Pim IIM Pim xim,Ex
im
pim xim
n
i 1
pi xiEx RD
If debt is positive also interest, RD, has to be paid. Exports need not equal imports because
debt and interest payments exist. If debt is negative RD is income from foreign wealth and ˙D
is the change in foreign assets which may be either positive or negative. The current account
deficit can be financed either by an increase in foreign debt or a decrease in reserves of
foreign exchange.
Equilibrium
Labour market equilibrium requires that labour demand for output production, including
j
Lj
energy production and production of energy-saving intermediates, must be equal to labour
supply L. Underemployment (dis)equilibria are allowed for. In that case employment is
determined by demand which is smaller than supply. The labour market is therefore
characterized by:
(15)
j
Lj L ≤ O
Investment can be financed by savings or new debt :
i j
piIij ˙W ˙D
(16)
i j
piIij ˙W ˙D
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3. The decision of the household
The household is assumed to optimize intertemporally based on expectations and policy
announcement information concerning carbon and energy taxes and related subsidies. The
utility function presented above is a temporary one. Integrating the temporary utility function
in equation (1) over time after multiplication by a discount term gives the intertemporale ρt
utility function. The Hamiltonian for the problem of the household is:
H
n
i 1
c
i
i
im
c˜
im
im f
l
lnEl λ{w
j
Lj RW
j
pij
n
1
pi ci
n n
n 1
p˜im c˜im t
r
e 1
ciCO2i
r
e 1
τi ci
n
r 1
si pi ci}
Given employment, profit income from firms, policy variables t, and and initial wealthτi si
W for the short run, the household chooses consumption and savings. Due to the basic
decision that the environmental problem is tackled by taxes the household can not choose the
environmental variable E, which therefore will be a pure externality to the household.
The first-order conditions are the budget constraint and
(17)∂H/∂W λR ˙λ ρλ or ˆλ ρ R or λ λ0 e (ρ R )t
(18)∂H/∂ci i c
i
1
i λpi 0,
i 1,...,e
(19)∂H/∂ci i c
i
1
i λ(pi t CO2i τi) 0,
i e 1,..., r
(20)∂H/∂ci i c
i
1
i λ[(1 si)pi] 0, i r 1,..., n
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(21)∂H/∂c˜im im c˜
im
1
im λp˜im 0
The interpretations are as follows: for non-energy products we have the usual condition that
marginal utility equals the price times the value of wealth. For energy products the tax on
is also a cost element and so is the specific energy tax. For energy-saving products, aCO2
subsidy for buying energy-saving products is subtracted from the price. The transversality
condition lim = 0 is implied in (17).λe ρt
The formal structure of the solution to the household’s problem is as follows: As the
initial value of W is given, the optimal initial value of has to be determined. The optimalλ
path of W and imply values for their change. Thus the impact of a price change onλ
quantities and have to be derived from the budget constraint (12) and (18)-(21) for givenci λ
values of W and temporary net expenditure, F. Net expenditure F can be written as:
(22)F
n
1
pi ci
n n
n 1
p˜im c˜im t
r
e 1
ci CO2i
r
e 1
τici
n
r 1
sipici 0
Impact effects of energy policy on households’ energy consumption
Next we discuss the impact of energy-policy measures on households at prices that have not
already adjusted to the new equilibrium, the so called ’impact effect’ as it is called in
macroeconomics. The reason is that most investigations in the literature present the new
equilibrium solution after the introduction of the new policy. However, we don’t know how
long the adjustment process takes until the new equilibrium is reached and what the path to
the new equilibrium will be. The impact effect tells what the first reaction of individuals is.
In (18)-(21) the consumer prices (henceforth indexed by an upper index c) are related to
producer prices in the following manner:
(23)p ci pi, with property ∂p ci /∂pi 1, i 1,..., e
(24)
p ci (pi tCO2i τi), with ∂p ci /∂pi 1,∂p ci /∂τi 1,
∂p ci /∂t CO2i, i e 1,..., r
12
(25)p
c
i (1 si)pi, with ∂p ci /∂pi 1 si,∂p ci /∂si pi,
i r 1,..., n
The elasticities of demand with respect to consumer prices for a given intertemporal allocation
of known life-time income are (see Helpman and Krugman 1985, Chap. 6 for the derivation):
(26)
ε
cp,i (∂ci/∂p ci )p ci /ci i (1 i )2[
n
1
1/(1
i
)
i
p i
/(
i
1)
i ] 1
(1
i
) 1
For an increasing number of firms the elasticity converges towards the last term.
The percentage change of the consumer demand if the ad valorem subsidy for energy saving
purchases is changed can be computed as:
(27)ε
cs,i (∂ci /ci)/(∂si/si) siεcp,i /(1 si), i r 1,...,n
A percentage change in the specific tax on energy can be shown to generate a percentage
change in its consumption of:
(28)(δci/δτi)(τi/ci) τi εcp,i / P ci , i e 1,..., r
An introduction of a carbon tax starting from level zero generates a percentage change of
consumption of:
(29)(δci /ci) dt εcpi CO2i /p
c
i , i e 1,..., r
To be able to compute the effects as expressed in (27)-(29) data on would be necessaryε
cp,i
on the household level. Unfortunately these are not available for energy-saving products.
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Long-run price elasticities for residential aggregate energy demand in EU countries are
between - o.23 and -1.40 in Brenton (1994), Kouris (1983) and Mittelstädt (1983). Short-run
elasticities are much smaller. Income elasticities are between .49 and 2.43 with most of the
estimates being in the neighbourhood of 1. For disaggregated fuels we have estimates by
Brenton (1994) and - based on British data - from Deaton (1975). In Deaton (1975) we find
income elasticities between -4 for coal and +3.7 for electricity and price elasticities between
+2 for coal and -2.9 for gas. In Brenton (1994) we find compensated own price elasticities
between -.65 for electricity in Denmark and -.87 in Spain and expenditure elasticities of about
unity for all countries and fuels. The difference between the results of Deaton and Brenton
seems to be rather extreme and supposedly stems from the different methods as discussed in
footnote 3 in Brenton (1994) and more broadly in Deaton (1975). Brenton, Kouris, Mittelstädt
and Deaton all provide a sophisticated discussion with respect to the reliability of these
estimates.
We can only compute the effects modelled above for different values of the elasticities
. We use alternative values of uncompensated price elasticities = -1.1, -2, -4, -10.ε
cp,i εcp,i
Sectoral elasticities on the highly aggregated level are lower because interfuel substitution
vanishes in the aggregation. But even on the level of single fuels the data reflect aggregates
across firms and therefore exclude the effects on price elasticities of interfirm competition.
Remember that for monopoly prices to exist price elasticities have to be smaller than minus
one. Otherwise monopoly profits could be infinitely high, a situation that is hardly realistic.
For a scenario on (27) we use an ad valorem investment subsidy of 10%, 25% and
50% respectively. The results for (27) are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
The subsidy elasticity of household demand for energy-saving products
ε
cs,i siεcp,i / (1 si)
ε
si
cp,i
10% 25% 50%
-1.1 .12 .36 1.1
-2 .22 .66 2
-4 .44 1.33 4
-10 1.1 3.33 10
The interpretation of results in Table 1 are as follows. Increasing the subsidy for energy
saving purchases by 1%,e.g., from 25% to 25,25% increases the demand for energy saving
products by x%, where x is the number in Table 1. If, e.g., the subsidy is 50%, a change to
50,50% increases the consumption of energy by a percentage equal to the price elasticity (see
last column). With low price elasticity -1.1 and only 10% subsidy a change to a 10,1%
subsidy increases the demand by .12% = 1,2 o/oo. The higher the level of the subsidy and the
elasticity assumed, the stronger the effect of a 1% increase of that subsidy. The reason is that
for each ECU a 1% increase in the ad valorem subsidy implies that the money value of the
10, 25, 50% subsidy is 1, 2.5 or 5 ECU cent respectively. However, the range for isε
cs,i
rather broad: it goes from .1 to 10. Sectoral elasticities and those for household panels (see
SEO 1992) are even lower than those used here for households. In that case an elasticity of
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unity will only be reached for a subsidy higher than 50%.
Next we look at the effect of a carbon tax on households’ demand for energy. We have price
data (see Europäische Gemeinschaften 1994) and carbon emission coefficients (see IPCC
Draft) for natural gas and heating gas oil. The EC average price for natural gas is 13 ECU
per Gigajoule(GJ). This is also the price for Germany. The emission coefficient is .02 ton
carbon per GJ (ton C/GJ). For heating gas oil (residential fuel oil) the average price is 12
ECU/GJ. This is also the price for the Netherlands, Spain and France). The emission
coefficient for heating gas oil is .015 ton C/GJ. Electricity prices are 23 ECU/GJ, which is
also the price for Spain and Belgium, but emission coefficients are not available. With a
carbon tax of 35ECU per tonC as suggested by the EC proposal mentioned above these (all
taxes included) prices become (13 + 35 0.015) ECU = 13,7ECU and (12+35.0.015) ECU
=12.525ECU. The increase in the price is therefore .7 ECU per GJ natural gas and .525ECU
per GJ heating gas oil which is a price increase of roughly 5% induced by the carbon tax
alone. The percentage changes in consumption, dc/c = dtCO2i/pc, of natural gas and heating
gas oil from a carbon tax, dt, of ECU 20, 35, 50 and 100 for the same elasticity as above
scenarios derived from equation (29) based on price effects alone are summarized in Table
2. Income effects and cross-price elasticities from taxes on other fuels will be discussed
separately below.
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Table 2
Impact effects of a carbon tax on private households change in consumption, dci/ci, of
Natural gas
carbon tax
(ECU per ton)
20 35 50 100
ε
cp,i
-1.1 -.034, -.06 -.08 -.17
-2 -.06, -.108 -.154 -.31
-4 -.12, -.216 -.308 -.62
-10 -3., -.54 -.77 -1.55
Heating gas oil
carbon tax 20 35 50 100
(ECU per ton)
ε
cp,i
-1.1 -.028, -.048 -.069 -.14
-2 -.05, -.0875 -.125 -.25
-4 -.1. -.175 -.25 -.5
-10 -.25, -.438 -.625 -1.25
1) In Brenton (1994) and Hermes (1993) (compensted own price) elasticities for household
aggregates are below unity. Elasticities in SEO (1992) for gas are also below one percent. The
use of lower values will make the conclusion drawn below even stronger.
A carbon tax of 35 ECU, inducing a 5% price increase will decrease demand by 6% and 4,8%
for natural gas and heating gas oil respectively under a price elasticity of -1.1 if the effect on
substitutes some of which have to bear a carbon tax as well is ignored. The effect is linear
in dt and in the price elasticity assumed. Price elasticities reported in the literature are at the
lower end of the above scenario.
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Table 3
Impact effects of an energy tax on private households percentage change in consumption,
dci/ci, of
Natural gas
energy tax
(ECU per GJ)
.3 .7 1.0 1.4
ε
cp,i
-1.1 -.025, -.06 -.08 -.118
-2 -.048 -.1 -.15 -.22
-4 -.09, -.21 -.3 -.43
-10 -.23 -.54 -.77 -1.07
Heating gas oil
energy tax
(ECU per GJ)
.3 .7 1.0 1.4
ε
cp,i
-1.1 -.028, -.06 -.06 -.13
-2 -.05, -.117 -.17 -.23
-4 -.1, -.23 -.33 -.47
-10 -.25, -.58 -.83 -1.16
Electricity
energy tax
(ECU per GJ)
.3 .7 1.0 1.4
dτ
-1.1 -.014, -.03 -.05 -.06
-2 -.026 -.06 -.09 -.12
-4 -.052 -.12 -.17 -.24
-10 -.13 -.3 -.43 -.61
Impact effects of an energy tax on energy consumption are considered in Table 3. Under the
EC proposal there will be a change of the energy tax, , of .7 ECU per Gigajoule. Table 3dτ
contains scenarios for the change in consumption dci/ci = of formula (28) withεcp,idτ/p ci
energy tax change, varying from .3 to 1.4, i.e from less than half to twice the amountdτ
contained in the EC proposal. Gigajoule prices corresponding to that formula are 13 ECUp ci
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for natural gas, 12 ECU for heating gas oil and 23 ECU for electricity, all of which are EC
average prices taken from Europaeische Gemeinschaft (1994).
Under the EC proposal the percentage change of GJ consumption of natural gas, heating gas
oil and electricity will be 6%, 6% and 3% respectively if income and cross-price effects from
taxes on other fuels are ignored. Again results are linear in the assumed elasticities and tax
rate changes. For electricity this value has been obtained under the assumption that there is
an energy tax only at the output level. These values will be different if coal and other fuels
are used and taxed on the input level. In this case there can be a carbon and an energy tax
on inputs for producing electricity.
The upper bound of an impact effect of an introduction of the EC proposal - still postponing
discussion of income and cross-price effects generated by taxes on other fuels - can be
obtained from adding up the percentage values of the 35-column of Table 2 and the .7 column
of Table 3. For alternative elasticity values of demand with respect to price this yields
Table 4
Impact effect of an introduction of the EC proposal on energy consumption
ε
cp,i
-1.1 -2 -4 -10
dc/c1 -.12 -.21 -.43 -1.1
dc/c2 -.11 -.21 -.41 -.926
1 for natural gas
2 for heating gas oil
Deaton (1975) finds an elasticity of -2.9 for gas demand in Britain. Applying that value here
the impact effect would be roughly 30% demand reduction as the starting point for analyzing
the price effect of an 10% price increase from carbon and energy taxes according to Table
4 for which the following modifications are necessary:
i) These effects have been calculated using the EU average price of 13 ECU for
natural gas and 12 ECU for heating gas oil when doing the division in the formula presented
above. However, households pay higher prices in almost all countries. Dividing by higher
prices reduces the effects of the above computations in some cases by more than one half.
ii) In Mittelstädt (1983) short-run elasticities of prices are about 1/4 of the long-run
elasticities reducing this number to a 7.25% reduction of demand for natural gas and heating
gas oil.
iii) Other energy forms also have to bear these taxes and therefore cross-price
elasticities will soften this effect. Therefore these are upper limits for single energy forms.
iv) All results from Tables 2-4 are extremely sensitive to the values of the tax rates,
the price elasticities and the price paid.
The income effect alone will be small: If a households spends as much as 1/3 of his
income for housing and 20% of that on energy then the energy share in his expenditure is 6%.
A price increase of 10% decreases his real income by .6%. With an income elasticity of unity
the income effect will decrease demand by -.6%. Even if the income elasticity is at the
highest level that can be found, 2.4, the demand decrease will be only 1.44%.
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If the mixture of energy and carbon taxes keeps the structure of demand approximately
constant and the price and income elasticities are at the upper value of the estimated ranges -
1.4 and 2.4 respectively the price increase of 10% and the income decrease of .6% decrease
energy demand by 15.5%. This is the upper level of possible demand reductions. Most
estimates in Kouris (1983), Mittelstädt (1983) and Brenton (1994) are half that size leading
to a long-run effect of a 7.7 % energy demand reduction from households from the EC
proposal values reached at the end of the "phasing in". With short-run price elasticities
of -.2 and an income elasticity of 1 to be taken from the same literature the reduction in
energy demand will be 2% + .6% = 2.6% in the short run. This is much less than the
reduction in energy demand during recessions. Of course for less CO2 intensive energy forms
than natural gas and heating gas oil the price increase is lower and for more CO2 intensive
energy forms the price increase is higher, but this is mainly coal for which there are special
rules of the game anyway. All in all reduction of competitiveness of energy in relation to
other products seems to be at a minimum given the necessity to protect the environment.
4. The decision of monopolistically competitive producers
Producers choose:
i) supply quantities xk≡
n
1
xkj ck I
s
k xkEx
ii) purchases of intermediates of all types (non-energy 1, ...,e; energy e+1, ..., r; energy
saving r+1, ..., n; imported n+1,..., n+n*) where energy-saving purchases reduce the energy
coefficients according to (8);
iii) the desired capital stock from (4) which implies investment demand for a givenKk Iik
value of the existing capital stock;
iv) labour demand from (3).Lk
The problem of the firm k then is to maximize the discounted sum of all future profits subject
to the equations of motion (6) and (8) with current profits
(11)
pik
n
j 1
pk xkj pk ck pkI
s
k pk xkEx
n
r 1
si pi xik
n
1
pi xik
im
pim xim,k t .
r
e 1
xikCO2i
r
e 1
τi xik R .⌡⌠
t
∞ i
Pi(τ) Iik(τ)dτ
[wk(1 sw1) sw2]Lk
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and the constraints
(3)Lk bLk aLk xk, k 1,..., n
(4)Kk bKk aKk xk, k 1,..., n
(5)
Kk ⌡⌠
t
∞
[
i
(e d(τ t)Iik (τ)βik ] d τ
with i 1,..., e,..., r,...., n
(6)˙Kk
i
Iik (t)βik d ⌡⌠
t
∞ i
[ed(τ t) Iik (τ)βik ] dτ
(7)xik aik xk i, k 1,..., r
Inserting (3) and (7) into the profit function (11), using (4), (6) and (8) as constraints yields
the current value Hamiltonian
H
n
1
pk xkj pk ck pk I
s
k pk xEx
n
r 1
sipixik
n
r 1
pi xik
r
1
pi(aik xk)
im
pim aim,k xk t
r
e 1
(aik xk) CO2i
r
e 1
τi aik xik
R ⌡⌠
t
∞ i
pi Iik d τ [wk(1 sw1) sw2] (bLk aLk xk) µ1k {Kk bKk
aKk xk} µ2k
n
r 1
( xik)βik µ3k {
i
Iik (t)βik d Kk}
The first-order conditions for firms are (4),(6), (8) and (with k = 1, ..., n)
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(30)δψ/δxk p xk pk
r
1
pi aik
im
pim aim,k t
r
e 1
aikCO2i
r
e 1
τi aik
[wk(1 sw1) sw2]aLk µ1k aKk 0, k 1,..., n
(31)∂ψ/∂xik (si 1)pi µ2kβikx
βik 1
ik ≤0, i r 1,..., n
(32)∂ψ/∂Iik Rpi µ3kβik I
βik 1
ik 0,
i 1,..., e..., r,...., n
(33)∂ψ/∂Kk µ1k µ3kd µ˙3k Rµ3k
(34)∂ψ/∂aik xk( pi tCO2i τi) µ˙2k Rµ2k,
i e 1,..., r
The interpretation of the first-order conditions is as follows. Equation (30) states that marginal
revenue equals marginal costs. and energy taxes increase marginal costs and wageCO2
subsidies decrease marginal costs. (31) states that the value of subsidies plus the value of the
reduction of the energy coefficients equal the price of the energy-saving technologies. (32)
states that the interest costs of an intermediate contributing to investment equals the marginal
value product of that intermediate good in the enhancement of the capital stock. (33) states
that the negative value of increasing the capacity, and depreciation valued at the shadowµ1
price of capital, is equal to the undiscounted change in the discounted shadow price ofµ3k
capital. (34) says that the change in the shadow price of energy coefficients must equal the
value of the reduction in: i) energy payments and ii) energy tax payments, all emanating from
a marginal change in the energy coefficient.
5. Policy when competitiveness is guaranteed
The implications of energy and carbon taxes on firms’ and households’ behaviour can now
be considered best by making a distinction between binding and not binding capacity
constraint.
The case of a binding capacity constraint.
Capacity in (4) is a state variable. If (4) is a binding constraint, it determines . TheKk xk
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price can be read from the demand curve as expressed by consumer prices in (18)-(20) and
(23)-(25) and the corresponding parts for investment, (32), and exports (not written down
explicitly). This has different consequences for the three different categories of products under
consideration:
For non-energy products, consumer prices are identical to producer prices because
carbon and energy taxes don’t appear in (18) and (23). Prices are fixed by capacity and
demand. The introduction of carbon and energy taxes increases marginal and average costs
and leads to lower profits. If there are zero profits without taxes there are losses and perhaps
exits. However, if tax policies are announced in time these are perfectly planned exits.
For energy products, consumer prices are higher than producer prices because taxes are added
to the latter. Consumer prices being fixed at the level at which capacity output can be sold,
energy producers are squeezed twice: i) taxes imposed on consumers lower producer prices
according to (24) because they act as a downward shift of a demand curve in the
price-quantity plane; ii) marginal costs are increased in (30). Both effects reduce profits and
perhaps lead to exits which may be perfectly planned if the policy is announced in advance.
For energy-saving products, a subsidy for energy-saving products to households acts like an
upward shift of the demand curve in (20) and (25). It allows the firm to set higher producer
prices. On the other hand, energy and carbon taxes increase marginal costs of energy
producers which therefore again reduces profits. In sum, carbon and energy taxes without
subsidies for energy saving make households a less profitable market segment for
energy-saving technologies under a binding capacity constraint. This part of the market will
shrink and makes investment less profitable. All effects are reducing profits which households
receive. Income elasticities of household demand determine the general equilibrium effects
of policy. However, subsidies for investment in energy-saving technologies could makeCO2
even households a profitable market segment for suppliers of energy-saving technologies.
The case of a non-binding capacity constraint.
If the capacity constraint (4) is not binding, is zero. Given the real world observation ofµ1k
unemployment and low degrees of capacity utilisation, this may be the more realistic scenario
if non-anticipated shocks (oil crises, high interest policies, financing the german unification)
in connection with slow speeds of adjustment in markets and other post-war institutions have
led to unemployment and lower demand than expected earlier. For the rest of this chapter we
concentrate on this case. In this case marginal revenue (where consists of consumption,xk
investment, export and intermediate demand) equals marginal cost, leading to a price
Pk MC /(p xk/pk 1)
with MC ≡
r
1
piaik
im
pim aim, k
t
r
e 1
aik CO2i
r
e 1
τi aik [wk(1 sw1) sw2] a ˙Lk
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The impact of carbon and energy taxes and wage subsidies on marginal cost is
dMC dt
r
e 1
aik CO2i
r
e 1
dτi aik [wk ( dsw1) dsw2] aLk
Energy and carbon taxes increase marginal costs whereas wage subsidies decrease marginal
costs. Wage subsidies are therefore an instrument to compensate firms in a way that
potentially leaves their marginal cost position unaffected by carbon and energy taxes.
Subsidies on energy-saving measures don’t have this effect because they decrease fixed costs
only upon impact and energy-saving intermediates are assumed not to be productive in the
production of goods. However, if marginal costs are kept constant to insure international
competitiveness and therefore prices and output don’t change, pollution and unemployment
are not decreased by carbon and energy taxes if the substitution between labour and energy
is zero in the short run on the firm or product level by assumption (see Figure 1). The same
holds empirically for the effects of exemption from a carbon tax (see Denis and Koopman
1995).
This is clearly a critique of the double dividend idea because it does not take into
account the constraint on international competitiveness. A critique of the double dividend idea
by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1992) has been based on the treatment of leisure instead
of unemployment. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1993) find even a triple dividend if the
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initial tax system is suboptimal. However, they do not take into account the sectoral
protection that is at the heart of the EC proposal.
The only way to reduce pollution if wage subsidies keep marginal costs non-increasing is to
pay energy-saving subsidies as well. This raises the crucial question whether their is enough
money from energy and carbon taxes to keep marginal costs constant in the short run and to
pay subsidies for energy-saving investments. This question can be analyzed as follows.
All policy measures that change marginal cost in this model start at value zero, which implies
. Inserting this into dMC = 0 yields the short-rundt t, dτi τi, dsw1 sw1, dsw2 sW2
condition for constant marginal costs or an unchanged competitive position of a firm under
a not binding capacity constraint:
(35)t.
r
e 1
aikCO2i
r
e 1
τ.i aik [wk( sw1) sw2]aLk 0
Marginal tax payments by the firm must equal marginal subsidies received for wages if the
competitive position has to be unchanged.
Multiplying by and summing over all firms k yields the condition for an unchangedxk
competitive position for the economy that can be compared to the budget of the government:
(36)t. k
r
e 1
aik xk CO2i
k
r
e 1
τi. aik xk
k
[wk( sw1) sw2] aLk xk 0
(36) says that to keep international competitiveness constant requires that the amount of
carbon and energy taxes paid by the firm is equal to the amount of wage subsidies on variable
labour cost. We look at the government budget to see what remains in the budget after these
transactions are carried out. Rewriting the budget constraint of the government after
replacement of by (3) yields:Lk
(13’)
t.
k
r
e 1
xik CO2i
k
r
e 1
τi. xik t
r
e 1
ci CO2i
r
e 1
τi. ci
k
n
r 1
si pi xik
n
r 1
si pi ci
k
[ s
w1 w sw2](bLk aLK xk) 0
Cancelling terms in (13’) which add up to zero according to (36) yields
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w1 w sw2]bLk 0
If the competitive position of firms has to be unaffected the sum of carbon and energy tax
revenues paid by households can be used for subsidies on energy-saving investments or to
subsidize fixed labour costs. If the latter is held to be undesirable from a political point of
view there is a clear policy rule for C02 and competition policy: The amount of carbon and
energy tax revenues paid by firms should be used to subsidize variable labour costs and the
amount of carbon and energy tax revenues paid by households should be used to subsidize
energy-saving measures. An important analytical implication of this rule is that under
non-substitutability between labour and energy for the short run, carbon and energy taxes on
firms serve the employment and competitiveness goals only by holding employment constant
and carbon and energy taxes of households serve the goal only. Subsidies for investmentCO2
in energy-saving technologies help to speed up the decrease of marginal cost over time and
therefore increase competitiveness and employment (see Figure 2). In sum, the only aspect
where policy, employment policy and competitiveness are not contradictory are subsidiesCO2
to energy-saving investments.
Of course the assumption of zero energy-labour substitution in the short run at the
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product level is not an assumption one should built policy upon. We will look in more detail
at substitution. It is well known from the discussion on capital-energy substitution that the
data used in empirical work are highly aggregated. Substitution is a composite effect of at
least three sources: i) shifts in the structure of the activities from energy intensive to less
energy-intensive activities; ii) energy-saving technical progress; iii) substitution in the narrow
sense of the word, i.e. along an isoquant at the product level. With highly aggregated data it
is impossible to disentangle these three effects. Therefore, not only is capital-energy
substitution an unclarified issue (see J.L. Solow 1987) but so is the energy-labour substitution.
A policy that holds the international competitiveness of sectors constant instead of building
on sectoral shifts has to rely on the other sources. Moreover, even if energy-intensive sectors
would not be protected against loss of competitiveness one should keep in mind that during
the oil crises "the long-established trend of labour-intensive industries toward declining
relative economic importance accelerated" (Marlay 1984, p.1279) although oil-price increases
could have theoretically induced energy-labour substitution. But this didn’t happen and
therefore it is much less likely to occur under a policy that increases energy prices muchCO2
less than the oil crises did. Therefore, the first of the three sources of substitution is not
available if sectors are protected against loosing competitiveness and substitution in the
narrow sense, i.e. along an isoquant on the product level is not a reliable way in itself. The
only remaining basis for policy is energy-saving investments because "declining relativeCO2
economic importance of industries intensive in their use of labour and energy, (is) suggesting
a role for advanced technologies aimed at improving industrial productivity" and " to the
extent that energy is an important factor in the costs of production, such technologies offer
potentially significant competitive advantages" (Marlay, 1984, p.1282). Reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions and unemployment therefore has to rely on investment in
energy-saving technologies. Tax revenues should therefore be recycled in the form of
subsidies for these investments. They speed up the decrease in marginal cost, increase
production and employment in a clean way (Figure 2).
A standard objection against subsidies is that they introduce a bias against cheaper
alternatives (see Proost and van Regemorter 1992). However, the question is in how far this
holds if other imperfections than just the environmental ones exist. If output reduction is
involved alternatives such as taxes will also have negative consequences for the employment
goal and will increase the monopolistic inefficiency and induce capital movements (see
Merrifield 1988 and Markusen, Morey and Olewiler 1993). The advantage of subsidies from
the point of view of having three imperfections - the environmental one, unemployment and
international competitiveness - is that they are all effected positively by the subsidy and
suggestions for alternative instruments also will have to be evaluated with respect to all
imperfections in an x-best setting. It should be kept in mind that in this proposal subsidies
to firms are financed by taxing the polluting households. The principle of causation is
therefore applied to households and also internationally because each country pays for its own
pollution reduction. Up to the exception made for producers in order to preserve
competitiveness this follows the textbook principle to tax the polluter and subsidize the clean
alternative. This principle has been successfully applied to car pollution before (see Kemp
1995). Of course adding an additional restriction such as ’international competitiveness’ has
some costs in making an instrument a bit more costly. However,in a world with many
imperfections one has to make sure that improving on one imperfection is not made at the
cost of worsening on the other imperfections. The international competitiveness constraint in
this chapter excludes cost increasing measures and therefore makes subsidies preferable to
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taxes. Investment subsidies to preserve firms survival have also been proposed in a different
setting by Carraro and Siniscalco (1992). What these proposals have in common is that
subsidies are expected to induce firms to do more of what they do anyway or to do it a bit
quicker. In other words, subsidies are expected to do what price changes do because this is
the way in which they act in economic models. They are not expected, however, to induce
totally different things (like passing thresholds) that would not have been done without
subsidies. In short, one cannot expect subsidies to perform better than the price mechanism
because they act as price changes and are preferable to taxes under the competitiveness
constraint.
Moreover, subsidies in one country or region may induce another country to give
subsidies to a close competitor to preserve his position in the competition. Thus subsidies
provide an incentive to foreign countries to contribute to GHG policy by using international
competition as an incentive mechanism for the participation in contributions to the solution
of a global common problem.
6. Markup empirics
If policy fails to keep the competitive position of firms constant it is important to note that
in models of perfect competition the impact of policies on prices and the competitive position
of firms are underestimated. In perfect competition models we have marginal cost pricing and
therefore dp/dMC = 1: prices increase or decrease as much as marginal costs do. However,
in imperfectly competitive models with constant price elasticities we have dp/dMC =
prices increase or decrease more than marginal costs do. Energy and1 / (p xk / pk 1) > 1: CO2
taxes imposed on firms will lead to price increases higher than the increase in marginal costs.
Similarly, decreases of marginal costs due to energy-saving investments will lead to price
decreases that are stronger than those of marginal costs. This is another reason why
conventional double dividend policy will underestimate the costs of mitigation whereasCO2
the favourable effects of energy-saving measures which decrease variable costs are higher
than under perfect competition. Under a linear demand function these results are turned on
their head: marginal cost changes result in smaller price changes under imperfect competition
because the elasticity changes drastically. However, their seems to be no evidence that linear
functions are more realistic from an empirical point of view and changes of price elasticities
seem to be a non-issue in the literature.
For this reason it is important to give an overview over of the literature on the relation of
prices over marginal costs.
Morrison (1992) reports markups of prices on marginal costs, p/MC, which are larger than
one for the US, Japan and Canada.
Markups of prices on marginal costs, p/MC,
Countries United States Japan Canada
lower value 1.100 (1961) 1.06 (1960) 1.065 (1961)
upper value 1.286 (1970) 1.463 (1979) 1.221 (1977)
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Most of the yearly values for the US and for Canada are between 110% and 120%, whereas
for Japan they are between 106% and 146%. In Table 5 we list the results of other studies
using a great diversity of methods (see references and Hairault and Portier 1993):
Table 5
Markups of prices on marginal costs p/MC
Country sector p/MC Author
USA 6 one-digit sectors >2 Hall 1988, 1990
USA 16 industries 1.2-1.4 Morrison 19901
USA industry 1.36 Domowitz et al. 1987
France macro 1.41 Laffargue et al. 1990
France macro 1.225 Hairault & Portier
1993
1 See Table 2 in Morrison 1990 for results on 18 industries at the two-digit level
Except for the values found by Hall these values are of the same order of magnitude as those
of Morrison.
Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1991) provide an increasing returns measure, called
IRS, for European industries based on Pratten (1988) and a literature review which allows to
calculate the ratio of variable to fixed costs, VC/FC, and the price/marginal-cost ratio, p/MC,
under the assumption of zero profits. For an explanation of the method see the appendix.
These results are listed in Table 6. Here again we find values of the same order of magnitude
for variations over time and across sectors as Morrison did. The values are between 1,06 and
1,43 and most of them also are between 1,10 and 1,20.
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Table 6
Markups of prices on marginal costs, p/MC,
based on increasing returns measures
Industry IRS in % VC/FC p/MC
Metalliferous
products
6 7,3 1,14
Non-metallic
mineral products
8 5,25 1,19
Chemical products 15 2,3 1,43
Metal products 7 6,14 1,16
Agric. & ind.
machinery
7 6,14 1,16
Office machinery &
precision inst.
15 2,3 1,43
Electrical goods 10 4 1,25
Transport 7 6,14 1,16
Food products 4 11,5 1,09
Textiles, clothing &
leather
3 15,6 1,06
Paper & printing
products
13 2,85 1,35
Timber & other
n.e.s.
5 9 1,11
Rubber & plastic
products
5 9 1,11
The bar over a number indicates its repeated occurrence. From other studies we get only data
on price elasticities of demand. These too allow to calculate values of the ratio of prices and
marginal costs, p/MC. They are summarized in Table 7.
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Table 7
Markups of prices over marginal costs
based on price elasticities
Country sector p/MC1 author
World 220 branded prod. 2.3 Tellis 1988
Australia
New Zeal.
220 branded prod. 1.93 Tellis 1988
USA 220 branded prod. 2.1 Tellis 1988
Europe2 220 branded prod. 2.6 Tellis 1988
Europe pharmaceuticals 1.27 Venables 19903
Europe atr. & synth. fibres 1.13 Venables 1990
Europe machine tools 1.08 Venables 1990
Europe office machinery 1.10 Venables 1990
Europe electric motors and
generators
1.17 Venables 1990
Europe domestic electrical
appliances
1.15 Venables 1990
Europe motor vehicles 1.16 Venables 1990
Europe carpet linoleum etc. 1.06 Venables 1990
Europe (UK) footwear 1.024 Venables 1990
(Deaton 1975)
1 We use the formula with as the inverse of the price elasticity.p MC / 1
2 Mean elasticity of 214 marketing studies for Europe (104 for the USA)
3 Venables 1990 contains calibrated results. Sectoral price elasticities are transformed into
those of the firm for several market structures.
In general, no inverse price elasticity of value zero was found which would yield a price
equal to marginal costs. In the case of marketing studies, the product level is used for branded
products. Here the markup values are a bit higher than for non-branded products. Bresnahan
(1989) reports values of the Lerner index L = (P-MC)/P. Seven of the twelve values reported
imply p/MC = 1/(1-L) ratios that are larger than two. Also in the studies by Morrison where
the p/MC ratio is found using estimations of cost function there is no indication that its value
is unity. The only exception we could find is the statistical insignificance of the estimated
mark-up for Taiwanese footwear exports to the US in Aw (1992). For Europe, the mark-up
of prices on marginal costs seems to be as high as for the US with the exception of the
branded-products study by Tellis (1988). This reduction can be obtained from reductions of
energy coefficients obtained from speeding up investment in energy-saving technologies
through investment subsidies. The marginal cost decrease enhances firm’s international
competitiveness and the price decrease relaxes households’ burden from energy and carbon
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taxes.
7. Investment dynamics
To see the impact of policy measures on investment in energy-saving technologies and
capital we look at the dynamics of the firm.
Writing (32) in growth rates under a constant rate of interest given from the world market
yields
(32’)µˆ3k (βik 1)ˆIik pˆi
can be obtained from (33) asµˆ3k
µ1k / µ3k d R µˆ3k
The shadow value of capital grows at a rate that is equal to interest and depreciation costs
minus the value of reducing the capacity constraint. Insertion into (32’) yields
(32’’)µ1k /µ3k d R (βik 1)ˆIik pˆi
The growth rate of investment is
ˆIik (pˆi (µ1k / µ3k) d R) / (βik 1)
If the percentage change in the price of investment goods is higher than the rate of
depreciation and the rate of interest corrected for the value of relaxing the capacity constraint
the growth rate of investment becomes negative, because investment today is less costly than
investment tomorrow.
Inserting from (33) and then and its growth rate from (32) and (32’)µ1k µ3k
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respectively into (30), where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, yields
(30’)
(p xk / pk 1)pk
n
1
piaik
im
pim aim,k t
r
e 1
aik CO2i
r
e 1
τi. aik [wk(1 sw1) sw2] aLk
aKk . [d R (βik 1) ˆIik pˆi] Rpi / (βik I
βik 1
ik ) 0, k 1,..., n
The first-order condition of marginal revenue being equal to marginal investment results in
a dynamic equation for investment in the capital stock. Energy and taxes increaseCO2
marginal costs and therefore have a negative effect on the level of investment and a positive
effect on the growth rate of investment which allows for a lower but increasing growth of
employment because the stock of capital determines output and employment in this model
when capacity is fully used. Wage subsidies have the opposite effect: the level of investment
increases but grows more slowly. For all these effects the ceteris paribus assumption has been
made.
A second dynamic equation for optimal firm behaviour can be derived as follows.
Solving (31) for and rewriting it in growth rates under the assumption of a constant adµ2k
valorem subsidy yields:
(31’)
(1 si) pi/(βikx
βik 1
ik ) µ2k and
µˆ2k s˙i/(1 si) pˆi (1 βik) xˆik,i r 1,...,n;k 1,...,n.
The value of energy-coefficient reductions, increases with an increase of the subsidy forµ2k
energy-saving measures, with an increase in the cost of energy conservation and with a
decrease in the quantities of these measures. The last term reflects the decreasing returns
assumed for energy coefficient reductions.
Dividing (34) by would in principle allow for insertion of the terms of (31’).µ2k
However, the index i in (31’) is for energy-saving products whereas that of (34’) is that of
energy products:
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(34’)xk ( pi t CO2i τi) / µ2k R µˆ2k
i e 1,..., r
Here the value of energy-coefficient reductions, , increases with energy prices and taxesµ2k
as well as carbon taxes and the interest rate.
To avoid confusion about indices we will use the index e henceforth for energy
sectors, s for energy saving sectors and i for non-energy sectors. Insertion of (31’) into (34’)
yields
(34’’)
xk ( pe tCO2e τi) /[(1 Ss)ps / (βsk x
β
sk 1
sk )] R
s˙
s
/(1 s
s
) pˆ
s
(1 β
sk) xˆsk
(34’’) is a dynamic equation for the investment in energy-saving technologies given the prices
of energy goods and energy-saving technologies. This process may be responsible for the
huge decrease in energy consumption that happened to occur during history (see Ausubel
1993 for a summary). It is the basis of the policy proposal made here. A higher growth rate
and a higher level of the subsidy (and of t and , the and energy taxes) for investmentτi CO2
in energy-saving technologies yields a higher growth of investment in energy-saving
technologies because it makes it more profitable to invest. Clearly, the task of a subsidy is
not to initiate investment that would not have been undertaken otherwise but it is merely to
enhance the volume of investment undertaken to save energy costs. An increased demand for
energy-saving technologies will allow for higher scale economies in their production given
the increasing returns technology. Going beyond the model it is clear that higher demand for
energy-saving technologies has a positive incentive effect for R&D in this field.
8. Conclusion
This chapter argues that a ’double dividend’ is more likely to be found in a policy that
subsidizes energy-saving investments out of the revenues of a carbon/energy tax than in a
policy in which the revenues are used to reduce labour costs. Besides reducing emissions,
such a policy thus decreases marginal costs because firms speed up the process of reducing
energy use. Reduced marginal costs increase output and therefore employment.
Such a policy is superior under the condition already agreed upon that the international
competitiveness of branches and firms should not suffer from abatement policy, so thatCO2
no sectoral shift occurs. In such a context, there is only substitution along an isoquant. Given
the limited opportunities of substitution at least in the short run and on the productlevel we
doubt that the standard double-dividend story is convincing. In contrast with that the
energy-savings potentials are well known to be quite large (see Marlay 1984, Blok et al. 1990
and Velthuijsen 1993). Investment in energy-saving technologies is the road to GHG-
emission reduction without endangering international competitiveness and employment of
sectors.
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The effects of the proposal are as follows:
i) Households pay energy and taxes which are used for subsidies onCO2
energy-saving investments. Under the EC proposal the price level effect is roughly 10% for
natural gas and heating gas oil. Substitution away from energy at the household level is likely
to occur but will be very modest. Demand for energy-saving products will increase. The
effects are limited. The costs of the policy are spread over the entire population, the
beneficiary of GHG emission reduction.
ii) Subsidies for energy-saving investments reduce the fixed costs of production
immediately because investment costs of energy-cost reduction are not part of the variable
cost of production. Over time firms will speed up the process of reducing energy coefficients.
As a result marginal costs decrease more quickly, which leads c.p. to lower prices and higher
output, making fixed costs per unit of output lower. Consequently, greenhouse gas emissions
will be reduced and employment will be higher as well. Energy-intensive sectors get a chance
to become ’clean’ without being the source of a new employment problem. The decrease in
marginal costs will lead to a decrease in prices. A reduction of marginal costs will have a
favourable impact on the competitiveness of firms. Exports going from the EC to the rest of
the world will benefit most because they don’t suffer from a decrease in demand induced by
energy and taxes unless the rest of the world is induced to undertake the same policy.CO2
This is another potential advantage of this proposal, that the policy deadlock of "we do
nothing if they do nothing" may be broken.
iii) If politicians believe in energy-labour substitution at the product level or allow for
sectoral shifts, firms can be taxed for energy use and pollution as well and the revenuesCO2
could be used for employment subsidies. This could keep marginal cost on the firm level
constant only if energy consumption is not very high. Almost nothing would happen in the
most energy intensive and polluting sectors when energy -labour substitution is weak whereas
under subsidies for energy-saving investments they become more clean according to their
energy-saving potentials.
In short, subsidies on investment in energy-saving technologies paid out of carbon and
energy taxes are a better way to stimulate competitiveness and employment and achieve GHG
reductions than wage subsidies are, if policy makers want to safeguard energy-intensive
sectors. Moreover, subsidies may induce other countries to undertake a similar policy.
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Appendix
IRS is defined as the percentage change in average costs from a 50% decrease of output.
Defining average costs, AC = FC + VC, in accordance with (3) or (4) as AC = w(a +bx)/x,
its derivative with respect to x is dAC/dx = -wa/x2 = -FC/x2, where FC is an abbreviation for
’fixed costs’ and VC ’variable costs’. The elasticity of AC with respect to x then is
(dAC/dx)x/AC = (-wa/x2 )x/[w(a +bx)/x] = (-wa)/[w(a +bx)]. Multiplying by dx/x yields IRS≡
dAC/AC = (dx/x)(-wa)/[w(a +bx)] = -.5(-FC)/C = -.5[-1/(1+VC/FC)]. Solving for VC/FC we
find VC/FC = MCx/FC = 1/2IRS - 1. Inserting data from Gasiorek, Smith and Venables for
IRS the ratio MCx/FC can be computed. Using this and the zero-profit assumption P = AC
the price/marginal-cost ratio can be computed as p/MC = AC/MC = (FC + VC)/MC = (FC
+ MCx)/MC = FC/MCx + 1.
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